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ABSTRACT 
Recent high-profile incidents of police misconduct have led 
to calls for increased police accountability. One proposed 
reform is to equip police officers with body worn cameras, which 
provide more reliable evidence than eyewitness accounts. 
However, such cameras may pose privacy concerns for 
individuals who are recorded, as the footage may fall under 
open records statutes that would require the footage to be 
released upon request. Furthermore, storage of video data is 
costly, and redaction of video for release is time-consuming. 
While exempting all body camera video from release would take 
care of privacy issues, it would also prevent the public from 
using body camera footage to uncover misconduct. Agencies and 
lawmakers can address privacy problems successfully by using 
data management techniques to identify and preserve critical 
video evidence, and allowing non-critical video to be deleted 
under data-retention policies. Furthermore, software redaction 
may be used to produce releasable video that does not threaten 
the privacy of recorded individuals. 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the aftermath of a controversial shooting of an unarmed man 
by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri,1 many police departments 
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1 See generally Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, 
BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354. 
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prepared to deploy police body worn cameras to capture video and audio 
footage of interactions with the public. On November 18, 2014, the 
Seattle Police Department, which had plans to deploy such cameras, 
received an anonymous request for disclosure of public records, in 
accordance with Washington State law.2 However, this request was 
staggering in scope: the requester sought records on every dispatched 
call, all police reports, and data on every records search conducted by 
Seattle P.D.3  
 Even more significantly, the requester sought all videos 
generated by both car-mounted dash cameras and body worn cameras 
since the program started.4 The requester, only known as 
“policevideorequests@gmail.com,” stated he “wanted to call attention to 
significant flaws in deploying body cameras without thought to privacy.” 
Through various social media outlets such as YouTube5 and Reddit,6 the 
requester uploaded the disclosed videos for public viewing and 
commentary. 
 Suddenly, Seattle Police officials found themselves in a bind. 
Washington State law does not allow agencies to refuse a disclosure 
request because the request is overbroad, and fees are only applicable for 
a limited portion of the costs.7 Yet, complying with the request would 
potentially “delay responses to prosecutors and defense attorneys seeking 
information for criminal trials,” and “violate the privacy rights of 
individual citizens, who will have their lives, their encounters with police 
and even their homes posted on the Internet.”8 Furthermore, “police 
videos are filled with sensitive information that is not disclosable under 
                                                          
2 Steve Miletich & Jennifer Sullivan, Costly Public-Records Requests May 





5 See Police Video Requests, Police Video Requests’ Channel Homepage, 
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/user/policevideorequests/featured (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
6 See policevideorequests, Overview of policevideorequests’ Reddit Posts, 
REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/user/policevideorequests (last visited Apr. 14, 
2015). 
7 Miletich & Sullivan, supra note 2. 
8 Id. 
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law, so police faced the onerous task of go[ing] through video, frame by 
frame . . . to redact sensitive images.”9 
 Thankfully for Seattle Police, they were able to make a deal with 
the anonymous requester, where he would drop his massive request and 
help Seattle P.D. develop their technological capacities, in return for the 
department’s cooperation in providing him access to police records.10 In 
contrast, other departments were not quite so lucky, and some agencies, 
such as Bremerton Police (WA), were forced to abandon their body worn 
camera programs in light of broad and unmanageable public records 
requests.11  
 Police body cameras have great potential to improve evidence 
collection and law enforcement accountability. But implementing them 
would be costly and difficult, because of the privacy concerns that must 
be accommodated. The privacy concerns of citizens who interact with 
law enforcement stem from state “open records” laws that may require 
disclosure of captured video and audio. While open records laws provide 
exceptions to disclosure, such as for keeping investigations confidential 
or for protecting the identity of informants, these will not be enough to 
address privacy concerns with respect to body worn cameras. Further 
policy refinements are therefore necessary to sufficiently protect privacy. 
 Although such refinements are necessary, agencies and 
lawmakers who wish to deploy police body worn cameras must ensure 
that privacy protection efforts do not limit camera use so much that they 
become useless. They must also ensure that such efforts are 
technologically feasible. One promising avenue for addressing these 
concerns while achieving privacy protection is the use of data 
management techniques. Data management would reduce the burdens 
associated with preparing public records for release, and would include 
stricter document retention policies, conditional retention, and “tagging.” 
Yet, despite their potential, these techniques come with possible side-
effects that lawmakers must consider before deployment of a police body 
worn camera program.  This note evaluates several proposed privacy 
solutions and describes how police departments and independent review 
boards may ensure that body worn camera programs work effectively. 
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I. POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 In the post-Ferguson conversation on police reform, support for 
body worn cameras is often centered on their unique advantages of small 
size, mobility, and evidentiary accuracy. The use of these cameras could 
potentially answer the age-old question of “who will watch the 
watchmen?”12 Whereas many previous police reforms focused on 
creating independent public bodies to review police activity,13 
technological advances have created new opportunities to enhance the 
abilities of supervisors and independent bodies to monitor officers 
through recorded video. With cameras becoming smaller, cheaper, and 
more advanced, the use of video to monitor police brings a number of 
benefits. Such benefits include improvements in police accountability 
and public trust, decreases in use of force by police and against police, 
reductions in citizen complaints, and stronger evidence via officer-eye 
videos.14 
 However, the disadvantages of using such equipment temper 
these potential benefits. Body worn cameras are expensive to purchase 
and deploy, increase administrative burdens, require both rigorous 
review and supervisor action to reap accountability benefits, and their 
use may decrease the quality of public-police interaction.15   
II. PRIVACY PROBLEMS OF POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS: LAW, 
PRIVACY, AND ANALOGUES 
 While a considerable body of public debate has emerged around 
the benefits of police body worn cameras, the disadvantages are 
                                                          
12 Juvenal, Satire VI, ll. 347–48 in JUVENAL: SATIRE 6, at 69 (Lindsay Watson & 
Patricia Watson eds., 2014).  
13 See, e.g., About CCRB, NYC CITIZEN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/about/about.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
14 See generally MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: 
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE (2014); LINDSAY MILLER & JESSICA TOLIVER, 
POLICE EXEC. RES. F., IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2014), http://ric-zai-inc.com/ 
Publications/cops-p296-pub.pdf. 
15 See id. (arguing citizens who wish to inform officers about a crime may 
decide against it due to video/sound recording and the increased likelihood of 
retaliation against “snitching,” and officers will also be discouraged from 
being flexible about smaller offenses such as minor instances of speeding, 
jaywalking, loud music, or public intoxication). 
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discussed less frequently.16 A problem that has received less 
consideration is the fact that body worn cameras present privacy issues 
relating to their ability to record video and audio anywhere police 
officers go, and the fact that videos may be public record subject to 
release upon request. Though similarities exist between body worn 
cameras and previously implemented technologies like police car dash 
cameras and closed circuit television (herein “CCTV”) monitoring, the 
nature of body worn cameras is sufficiently different that these previous 
analogues do not supply ready solutions to these problems. 
A. Dealing with Sensitive Information: Open Government/Records 
Acts 
 State Open Government/Records Acts and their Federal 
analogue, the Freedom of Information Act, “are a product of the ‘open 
government’ climate brought about by distrust of government 
accountability and by misuse of government power during the civil rights 
and Vietnam protest era.”17 Often times, videos taken from police 
equipment are covered by such acts, and police agencies have the legal 
obligation to turn over such videos upon request.18 For example, the 
Public Disclosure Act in Chapter 42 of the Revised Code of Washington 
(herein “RCW Ch. 42”) applies to any record “relating to the conduct of 
government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary 
function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency 
regardless of physical form or characteristics.”19 Furthermore, the term 
“records” includes film, tapes, and recordings.20  
 However, many public disclosure statutes also provide disclosure 
exceptions that pertain to law enforcement records. For example, RCW 
Ch. 42 provides that records exempt from public disclosure requirements 
include specific investigative records “essential to effective law 
enforcement or for the protection of any person’s right to privacy,” 
information that could reveal the identity of crime witnesses or crime 
                                                          
16 See generally Harold M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 
WASH. U. L. REV. 831 (2015). 
17 ERIC M. STAHL, MICHAEL J. KILLEEN & DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, OPEN 
GOVERNMENT GUIDE: OPEN RECORDS AND MEETINGS LAWS IN WASHINGTON 
1 (Gregg Leslie & Mark Caramanica eds., 6th ed. 2011). 
18 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070 (2005). 
19 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010 (2010). 
20 Id. 
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complainants, and investigative records pertaining to sexual assaults or 
the identity of child victims of sexual assault.21  
 The privacy exception against disclosure in RCW Ch. 42 
specifies that “right to privacy” is “invaded or violated only if disclosure 
of information about the person [w]ould be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, and . . . is not of legitimate concern to the public.”22 
While what is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” is unclear in the 
narrow investigative record context,23 both prongs of this test must be 
satisfied in order to prevent disclosure.24 Furthermore, the exception only 
applies to ongoing investigations.25 
 Therefore, a requester who can defeat the second prong by 
showing that the recordings are “of legitimate concern to the public,” 
will override the privacy concerns raised by disclosure, and can obtain 
and release the recordings.26 Even if release of the video would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, the legitimate concerns of the public 
would justify the release.27 Furthermore, closure of the ongoing 
investigation also turns the closed investigative record into an open 
record that must be disclosed.28 Lastly, “[b]ecause the public policy . . . 
is to favor disclosure, all exemptions are to be narrowly construed.”29 
Under this scheme, it is frighteningly easy for police body camera video 
of private citizens to become releasable public records.  
 While RCW Ch. 42 includes the aforementioned disclosure 
exceptions, it also specifies that “exemptions of this chapter are 
inapplicable to the extent that information, the disclosure of which would 
violate personal privacy or vital governmental interests, can be deleted 
from the specific records sought.”30 Therefore, if the sensitive and 
                                                          
21 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.240 (2013). 
22 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (1987) (emphasis added). 
23 See generally MICHELE L. EARL-HUBBARD & GREG OVERSTREET, 
WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.05 (Kristal K. 
Wiitala ed., 2012). 
24 See id. (citations omitted).  
25 See id. (citing Ashley v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 560 P.2d 
1156, 1159 (1977)). 
26 See id. (citation omitted). 
27 See id. 
28 See id. (citing Ashley v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 560 P.2d 
1156, 1159 (1977)).  
29 See id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030) (emphasis added)). 
30 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.210 (2005) (emphasis added) (providing 
exceptions to this rule as well). 
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private information can be redacted, the agency must redact it and the 
records must be disclosed.31 Furthermore, there are very few bars to how 
the requester can use the records.32  
 Because police videos are redactable and videos obtained can be 
used in almost any way the requester desires, police agencies are forced 
to bear the burden of redacting the videos they are required to disclose.33 
This is so that these disclosures do not “violate the privacy rights of 
individual citizens, who will have their lives, their encounters with police 
and even their homes posted on the Internet.”34 With respect to preparing 
the videos for mandatory disclosure, the current limits of software and 
technology make redacting a herculean task. James McMahan, policy 
director at the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, 
commented, “[t]he only way to identify people in a video or an audio file 
is by watching or listening to it in real time. You can’t do a word search 
in a video, you can’t do a voice search in an audio . . . We’ve got to put a 
real body in a chair in front of a screen.”35 While the state of the 
technology is improving, it is not yet fully mature, and successful 
implementation in the present day must take into account the 
burdensome nature of redacting videos.36 
 Additionally, while statutes may permit police to collect fees to 
offset the costs of producing documents, they do not cover all costs.37  
Even more significantly, the fees do not provide for the maintenance and 
storage costs for the records.38 Furthermore, the costs of searching 
records are often not covered,39 and there may be limits on whether or 
not agencies can collect fees upfront.40 While many public agencies face 
budget constraints, for small law enforcement agencies with more limited 
                                                          
31 See id. 
32 See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(9) (providing that agencies cannot sell or 
“provide access to lists of individuals requested for commercial purposes”). 
33 Miletich & Sullivan, supra note 2. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See id. 
37 See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.120 (forbidding fees for inspecting  
documents, locating documents, making documents available, but allowing 
reasonable charges for providing copies given that they do not exceed actual 
costs directly related to copying). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. (allowing agencies to require deposits, but limiting to no more than ten 
percent of estimated cost). 
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budgets and smaller personnel pools, these upfront and unreimbursed 
costs may prove to be fatal to the agency’s effort to deploy body worn 
cameras, given their inability to comply with requests for videos under 
public document disclosure laws. 
B. Privacy Implications of Police Body Worn Cameras 
 Though the highly mobile and up-close nature of police body 
worn cameras can yield great benefits, it is precisely their ability to 
record whatever the officer sees that poses privacy concerns. The 
problems stemming from their ability to record in private spaces are 
further compounded by their ability to capture close-up recordings of 
both voices and faces in an easily disseminated electronic format. 
Furthermore, even though members of the public might expect 
government “intrusion” when they actively call for police service, body 
worn cameras are not limited to recording only when responding to calls 
for service. If body worn cameras are set to record as a default, they can 
also take on a constant, pervasive monitoring role with repercussions for 
surveillance and tracking. 
1. Right to Privacy 
 Legally, one’s “right to privacy” can be formulated in many 
different ways. American constitutional law protects an individual from 
unreasonable search and seizure by government officers, based on that 
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” which requires “first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”41 Additionally, tort law commonly covers 
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another and unreasonable 
publicity given to a person’s private life as forms of “invasion of 
privacy.”42 
2. Intrusion of Cameras into Private and Public Space 
 However one formulates “privacy,” it is clear that the mobility of 
body worn cameras enables police to proactively carry them into private 
spaces that one may normally expect to be closed to the general public, 
such as private residences. Even if the police officers themselves have a 
warrant or some other exception to the individual’s “expectation of 
privacy,” the disclosable and easily distributable video from their 
cameras effectively turns the privileged entry of a number of officers into 
                                                          
41 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (J. Harlan, concurring). 
42 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 29 (1990). 
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a ride-along for thousands of watchers who may view the released videos 
in the future.43  
 Furthermore, that same mobility allows video and audio to be 
captured in close enough proximity as to allow easy identification of 
faces and voices. Making matters even worse, police officers respond to 
intensely emotional and personally invasive crimes such as domestic 
violence and sexual assault, and the intrusion of a responding policeman 
or specially-trained detective into one’s personal sphere may no longer 
be limited to the responding officers. Body worn cameras bring with 
them the explosive possibility that perfectly preserved video and audio of 
the intensely traumatizing experiences of vulnerable victims could be 
pushed into the public sphere and be exposed to millions of viewers.44 
 Additionally, the passive “always-on” capabilities of body worn 
cameras may cause special privacy concerns in the public sphere. While 
those who call for police service may expect “intrusion” to a certain 
degree, police body cameras may be set to constantly record even the 
general public and persons who are not actively interacting with the 
police. The “always-on” deployment posture advocated by the ACLU45 
results in a virtual dragnet of footage, with individuals who do not call 
for police services caught on video along with those who requested the 
police services. While those who call for police service (or have the 
police called on them) can expect to have public records made of the 
encounter in the form of dispatcher logs, police reports, and body camera 
footage, one might not expect public records to be made about them 
simply because they walked down the street in view of a police officer.  
 Furthermore, facial recognition software, GPS tracking of 
cameras, and a database of body camera footage may eventually create a 
system like license plate reader databases, in which the monitoring and 
tracking of license plate images and the movement of individuals is now 
possible.46 As noted by Harley Geiger, senior counsel with the Center for 
                                                          
43 While lawmakers could simply categorize videos inside private property as 
part of the exception for privacy in disclosures, accusations of racist conduct by 
police inside a private residence (e.g. an arrest or use of force against a minority) 
would be made far worse by the refusal of prosecutors to disclose body camera 
evidence. 
44 See White, supra note 14, at 27–28. 
45 See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 14, at 12. 
46 Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers, THE WALL STREET J. (Jan. 
26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-14223 
14779. 
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Democracy and Technology, “[e]nough of those cameras make it 
possible for government and companies to map a person’s movements, 
like when they attend a political rally or discreetly visit someone.”47  
3. Previous Analogues: Dash Cameras and CCTV 
 This brave new world of police body cameras raises privacy 
concerns that are not entirely new, as analogues exist in other forms of 
law enforcement video monitoring, namely police car dash cameras and 
CCTV. However, the concerns of those technologies do not map 
squarely onto the issues raised by body worn cameras, mainly due to the 
mobility and proximity of cameras to recorded persons. Therefore, the 
questions raised by body worn cameras cannot be entirely answered with 
the lessons learned from CCTV and dash camera implementation. 
 Firstly, police car dash cameras can be considered to be the 
mother of body worn cameras. Mounted in law enforcement vehicles, 
these cameras go wherever police officers drive their cars, and 
commonly record the area in front of the patrol car.48 Much like body 
worn cameras, dash cameras may also capture audio,49 and the 
recordings are often subject to Open Government/Records Acts.50  
 However, unlike dash cameras, body worn cameras present a 
greater voyeurism/privacy problem due to the mobility of body cameras, 
the larger amount of footage captured, and calls for “always on” 
recording parameters.51 The car-mounted nature of dash cameras 
necessarily restricts how close the dash cameras can get to individuals, 
due to the length of the hood of the car itself and the fact that the car will 
be stationary and cannot automatically follow highly mobile use of force 
incidents while the police officer is outside of the car. Therefore, the 
level of detail and video quality will likely be lower than that of a body-
mounted camera, which approaches individuals as closely as the police 
officer does. This could make it easier to recognize individuals captured 
by body camera video, compared to more distant footage from dash 
cameras.  
                                                          
47 Tom Risen, DOJ Spying and the Business of Car Surveillance, U.S. NEWS 
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/28/doj-spying-
and-the-business-of-car-surveillance. 
48 Erika Aguilar, LAPD Finds That Patrol Car Dash Cameras Are No Panacea, 
SOUTHERN CAL. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/news/ 
2014/12/05/48504/lapd-finds-that-patrol-car-dash-cameras-are-no-pan. 
49 Id. 
50 See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010 (2010). 
51 See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 14, at 12.  
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 Furthermore, unlike police officers, police cars (generally) do 
not end up inside residences and other spaces where individuals could 
have a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” thus reducing the chances 
that a privacy interest could be violated by dash cameras. Police officers, 
however, are much more likely than cars to end up in such private 
spaces, and therefore, the video from body cameras presents a greater 
privacy issue than that of dash cameras. 
 Compounding the problems from increased mobility and 
proximity of police body camera recordings is the fact that while 
prominent advocates such as the ACLU are calling for police body 
cameras to be “always on,”52 dash camera videos are usually very limited 
because they are often activated only when emergency lights are 
activated.53 Therefore, “[w]hen a [police officer] activates the emergency 
light bar on his or her cruiser, the dash camera begins capturing footage 
until the light bar is turned off. That means an officer could go an entire 
shift, or potentially days, without activating the dash cam.”54 
 With a far higher degree of mobility, proximity, and more 
intrusive recordings, police body worn cameras create a stronger and 
more indiscriminate dragnet of video because they are more detailed and 
intrusive than their dash camera counterparts. Even though dash cameras 
are less intrusive than body cameras,  
[v]ideo from dashboard cameras, a more widely used 
technology, has long been exploited for entertainment 
purposes. Internet users have posted dash-cam videos of 
arrests of naked women to YouTube, and TMZ 
sometimes obtains police videos of athletes and 
celebrities during minor or embarrassing traffic stops, 
turning officers into unwitting paparazzi.55  
                                                          
52 See id. at 13 (The ACLU argues dash cams should record all encounters with 
the public. Officers would be required to activate cameras not only during 
calls for service or law-enforcement related encounters, but also during 
informal conversations with the public). 
53 See John Voket, Newtown Police Weighing Pros, Cons of Body Cameras, THE 
NEWTOWN BEE (Mar. 27, 2015, 9:53 AM), http://newtownbee.com/newtown-
police-weighing-pros-cons-of-body-cameras/. 
54 Id.  
55 Matt Pearce, Growing Use of Police Body Cameras Raises Privacy Concerns, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-body-cameras-20140927-story.html# page=1. 
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Therefore, body camera footage treated under the same disclosure regime 
as dash camera footage could potentially be used in the same way with 
even more egregious results, and “[o]fficers wearing body cameras could 
extend that public eye into living rooms or bedrooms, should a call 
require them to enter a private home.”56 
 Furthermore, the explosion of constant and pervasive 
surveillance by police-run CCTV poses privacy problems as well, but not 
necessarily to the same degree of intrusiveness as body worn cameras. 
While police CCTV is generally set to constantly record, police CCTV 
cameras are mounted in public spaces, and are strategically placed to 
monitor general areas rather than specific individuals.57 This is an 
important distinction from police body cameras, which do not necessarily 
remain in public space, and do follow specific individuals if police 
officers choose to do so. 58 
 Despite these differences, some of the problems inherent in 
police CCTV also carry over to police body cameras, and are even 
exacerbated by the mobility of the cameras. For example, police misuse 
of surveillance to monitor disfavored groups or individuals, and the 
ability to use facial recognition to track individuals via networks of 
CCTV cameras could easily carry over to police body cameras as well, 
given that body cameras are in essence mobile, close-up CCTV 
cameras.59 Furthermore, both body cameras and CCTV cameras raise 
concerns about over-surveillance, recording of public space, and a 
“chilling effect” on public life.60 Significantly, police body cameras bring 
those public problems to private spaces and activities, and introduce the 
possibility of an even stronger chilling effect against private expression, 
assembly, and activities by creating video recordings of private spaces 
and activities which may be releasable to the general public. While 
police officers may already enter private spaces under certain limited 
circumstances, there is a difference between a limited number of police 
officers entering one’s private space, and having videos from that entry 
available to the entire public for viewing.61 
                                                          
56 Id.  
57 See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 14, at 11. 
58 Id. 
59 See What's Wrong with Public Video Surveillance?, AM. C.L. UNION, https:// 
www.aclu.org/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance?redirect=technology-
and-liberty/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance. 
60 See id. 
61 See supra Section II.b.2. 
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III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROBLEMS: ADVANTAGES 
AND DISADVANTAGES 
 Many of the problems raised by police body worn cameras are 
related to their status as public record and the difficulties of reviewing, 
redacting, and maintaining video records in accordance with public 
interest and law. Despite these problems, body cameras still retain 
significant advantages that may outweigh these disadvantages. Especially 
at a time when public trust in police is low, law enforcement agencies 
should endeavor to put this technology to productive use. However, in 
light of the aforementioned problems, agencies and lawmakers must 
carefully tailor deployment plans in order to maintain the ability to 
comply with mandatory disclosure and provide a means of ensuring 
police accountability, without unnecessarily trampling over privacy 
concerns. 
A. Quick but Problematic Potential Solutions 
 Some solutions to the mandatory disclosure and privacy 
problems of police body cameras may sound particularly appealing due 
to the perceived ease of implementation. Some of these solutions, 
however, come with hidden problems that seriously undermine the very 
reasons for implementing body worn camera programs in the first place. 
 One such solution is to restrict recording policies, either by tying 
recording to consent of individuals being recorded, or by giving police 
officers discretion to decide when recording is appropriate. While many 
police departments already require officers to inform individuals that 
they are being recorded when feasible,62 the ACLU’s position is that 
police officers should ask members of the public for consent to record 
the conversation.63 However, this approach is subject to administrability 
concerns. For example, it may be extremely difficult for departments to 
formulate clear, fast, and effective guidance on when officers are 
                                                          
62 See, e.g., Department Directive: Digital Imaging, Digital Audio & Video, and 
Body Worn Camera Systems, BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT (July 22, 
2014), https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/Police/Key-Department-Directives 
(follow “DD14 - Digital Imaging, Digital Audio & Video, and Body Worn 
Camera Systems.pdf” hyperlink). 
63 Markeshia Ricks, Chief: Cop Body Cams Coming, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Dec. 
4, 2014, 9:21 AM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/ 
entry/nhpd_body_cams_coming (“ACLU-CT spokeswoman Jeanne Leblanc 
said individual officers should not get to arbitrarily decide when their cameras 
should be off, but in routine matters that take them into peoples’ homes, they 
should have to ask for permission to record.”). 
359 POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS AND PRIVACY [Vol. 14 
required to ask for consent, or can override refusal to consent. 
Furthermore, individuals who are forming the intent to flee or assault a 
police officer are unlikely to consent to recording, and by the time police 
officers are in a fight or chase, it may be difficult or physically 
impossible to reactivate a body camera. This would make it far more 
likely that the public will be deprived of the benefit of video evidence in 
use of force incidents. 
 Furthermore, giving police officers broad discretion on when to 
record would allow officers to take privacy and sensitivity concerns into 
consideration before recording. However, it is important to note that this 
would exacerbate the very problems with accountability and 
transparency that body worn cameras are designed to address. With wide 
discretion, it is likely that many officers who oppose the use of body 
cameras will be reluctant to turn them on.64 In addition, selective 
recording would only exacerbate accountability problems by giving “bad 
cops” a way to hide abusive and illegal behavior. Even in a situation 
where force was used appropriately after cameras were turned off, the 
turning off of the camera could be seen by the public as a deliberate 
attempt to conceal police brutality.65 
 More drastically, it is also possible that Open 
Government/Records Acts could be amended to exempt police body 
worn camera video from disclosure, thereby eliminating privacy issues 
stemming from the mandatory disclosure of video to the public and also 
eliminating the burden of complying with such requests.66 For example, 
in February 2015, the Kansas State Senate passed an amendment to the 
Kansas Open Records Act that would keep mandatory disclosure of 
police audio and video recordings limited to the individuals recorded, 
their attorneys, and parents or guardians of those individuals.67 At least 
                                                          
64 See WHITE, supra note 14, at 31 (In a study by the Mesa Police Department, 
when police officers were permitted discretion to activate body cameras when 
they “deemed appropriate,” use of the cameras declined by 42% than when 
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65 See id. at 32. 
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fifteen other states have seen similar measures proposed, with many only 
allowing those who are actually in the video to access those videos.68  
One such bill in Arizona goes even further and “declares that body 
camera recordings are not public records, and as such can be released 
only if the public interest ‘outweighs the interests of privacy or 
confidentiality or the best interests of the state.’”69 
 However, the removal of police body worn camera video from 
the scope of Open Government/Records Acts is a deceptively simple 
solution that undermines the police accountability justification for body 
worn cameras in the first place. By creating exceptions from disclosure 
for the footage, legislators may alleviate burdens of production and some 
privacy concerns at the cost of fueling the distrust of police that led to the 
deployment of body worn cameras in the first place.70 While individuals 
may be able to access the videos in which they were themselves 
recorded,71 expansive citizen review of police forces becomes much 
more difficult without giving individuals broad enough access to identify 
overarching patterns of misbehavior, such as profiling and 
discrimination. By undermining the ability of the public to monitor and 
hold law enforcement agencies accountable, statutory exemption of all 
police body camera videos from disclosure undoes the campaign to 
increase public confidence in police, and returns reform back to square 
one. Meanwhile, police departments would still incur the significant 
costs of purchase, maintenance, and storage, without providing the 
accountability benefits that made body cameras attractive to deploy in 
the first place. 
B. Techniques for Limiting Video Retention and Protecting Privacy 
 While individual consent, officer discretion, and statutory 
exclusion are problematic at best, it is possible to employ systematic and 
technology-based solutions which may yield results that do not 
undermine the policies behind deploying police body worn cameras. A 
promising potential solution for reducing both administrative costs and 
privacy concerns is reducing the amount of video retained, by shortening 
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retention periods and narrowing long-term retention to videos showing 
use of force and other events of public interest, such as accidents, 
protests, and evidence cutting against false accusations by the police or 
against the police. Furthermore, improving the way videos are stored and 
deploying rapidly-improving software aids can reduce the administrative 
burden of complying with Open Government/Records Acts. 
1. Data Management 
 a. Setting Document Retention Policies 
 One line of potential solutions to the privacy problems created 
by mandatory disclosure of police body camera video is simply to limit 
the amount of video retained as public record. A police agency that sets a 
shorter document retention period by policy could delete videos after a 
certain time period if the video has not been used in an investigation or 
otherwise been identified as potentially useful evidence.72 This would 
allow for automatic deletion of videos, except the significant ones, where 
force was used, race was potentially a factor, searches were conducted, 
or some situation of potential public interest took place.73 
 Because the limitations of current technology require tedious 
manual review and redaction of videos, a blanket request for all videos 
retained as public record would be time consuming and costly for police 
agencies to fulfill.74 A clear document retention policy, however, would 
reduce the amount of video held as public record, and therefore, would 
limit the total amount of potentially sensitive video that could be 
requested.75 Simultaneously, such a policy would also limit the amount 
of time and funding that the agency would have to devote to searching 
for and redacting material prior to disclosure.76 Furthermore, this would 
also lower the cost of video evidence storage, since there would be less 
to store.77 
 b. Tagging Videos and Identifying Privacy Concerns 
 While identification of videos with evidentiary significance and 
potential for public interest is an important step in implementing a 
document retention policy and deciding what should be automatically 
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deleted, it also makes complying with disclosure requests easier and 
faster. Officers returning from patrol can label, or “tag,” videos as 
evidentiary or non-evidentiary, and can even refine those tags down to 
specific types of incidents, whether it be a traffic stop or an assault on a 
police officer.78  
 Significantly, it may be possible to tag videos implicating 
privacy-sensitive contexts such as private residences, domestic violence, 
interaction with minors, or ongoing investigations. With the 
identification and tagging finished, complying with a specific records 
request would be much simpler.79 For example, for a records request for 
videos of traffic stops, the search would require just a text search of a 
database for “traffic” rather than sifting through videos trying to figure 
out if the incident depicted is a traffic stop as opposed to the 
investigation of a suspicious vehicle. Furthermore, agencies could 
potentially save time when trying to identify videos for redaction because 
the officers already identified sensitive videos in advance. 
2. Software-Based Privacy Protections and Redaction Technology 
 In addition to the aforementioned document retention policies, 
tagging, and statutory amendments, technological solutions to privacy 
concerns and redaction difficulties may be on the horizon. For example, 
the popular web-based video host, YouTube, already makes automatic 
face-blurring software available for those who upload videos to the 
website.80 Furthermore, voice changing software is readily available,81 
with more limited versions available for free.82 As technology improves, 
other automatic redaction tools may become available as well, all of 
which may alleviate the burden of complying with Open 
Government/Records Acts and make it easier for agencies to redact 
videos and protect the identity and privacy of individuals in the requested 
videos. 
 Such technology could also make it possible for agencies to 
automatically produce low-resolution, blurred-out video and modified 
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363 POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS AND PRIVACY [Vol. 14 
voices for widespread and immediate public release. This would allow 
agencies to immediately release video to counter media speculation and 
allow the public the opportunity to comb through video records, all 
without identifying the individuals involved or clearly depicting private 
spaces. 
3. Criticisms and Concerns of Proposed Solutions 
 The use of police body worn cameras is fraught with hidden 
hazards, and the aforementioned solutions all have potential downsides 
that must be carefully considered before deployment. For example, 
reliance on tagging may be conceptually simple, but actually requires 
officers to perform a great deal of preemptive work to tag all videos as 
they are taken,83 rather than only when disclosure requests are made. 
Additionally, the usefulness of tagging relies on the accuracy of labeling, 
and envisioning what purpose the video may serve in the future. What is 
a normal traffic stop to a police officer may become a point of data in a 
profiling case, or a run-of-the-mill conversation may become an 
unprofessional conduct allegation at a later date, at which point the video 
may have been deleted due to shorter retention policies for videos tagged 
as having no evidentiary significance or controversy attached. 
Additionally, it may be difficult for police officers to predict which 
videos may reveal information that impacts a future criminal 
investigation, which could lead to failure to tag the video as sensitive. 
Therefore, this approach is particularly weak in situations where police 
officers need to predict future controversies and tag videos based on that 
conjecture. 
 Even more significantly, tagging requires that officers self-report 
on what happened in the video.84 Because body worn cameras are often 
implemented to increase police accountability and transparency, the 
potential for officers to “hide” bad conduct by tagging their own videos 
with incorrect tags or simply not tagging certain videos may undermine 
the benefits of body worn cameras by making it harder for supervisors 
and investigators to find and identify instances of unprofessional and 
illegal conduct.85 Therefore, due to the potential for inaccuracy and 
intentional obfuscation, a prudent supervisor concerned about both police 
                                                          
83 MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 14, at 32. 
84 See id. 
85 Similar concerns animate writings about police deleting videos taken of them 
by citizens. See generally Conor M. Reardon, Note, Cell Phones, Police 
Recording, and the Intersection of the First and Fourth Amendments, 63 
DUKE L.J. 735 (2014). 
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accountability and liability may reasonably choose to go through the 
same old painstaking manual redaction process rather than risk impaling 
his or her career upon inaccurate descriptions of videos and accidental 
disclosure of sensitive materials. 
 The use of software is still currently limited by the inability of 
software to identify and analyze the content of audio, and whether the 
audio discusses matters of an ongoing investigation or private matters. 
Similarly, software still does not yet distinguish between the interior of 
homes and of public buildings, or automatically redact tattoos, clothing 
choices, mannerisms, and patterns of location that may be used to 
identify and even stalk individuals. While such technology is actively 
being pursued with the cooperation of privacy activists,86 the state of the 
art is still limited and public disclosure requests still entail heavy burdens 
and privacy concerns for police agencies. Furthermore, even after 
software is used to blur video and modify voices, the video may still 
allow the public to identify persons in the video by context, which would 
discourage individuals from reporting crimes, and may even place 
informants at significant risk. 
 Despite these problems, the suggested solutions of shortening 
data retention policies, tagging videos, and using redaction technology 
still retain considerable advantages by at least making sure that 
significant amounts of video are actually preserved, with less potential 
for “missing” important incidents. Additionally, closer supervision and 
auditing of video tagging may encourage a culture of accountability, and 
force officers to tag their videos accurately and report use of force 
incidents to the chain of command. Lastly, the inexorable march of 
software and technology may yield yet undeveloped techniques for 
automated context-based redaction, and may even allow automatic 
identification of intentionally mislabeled violent incidents.87 In light of 
these retained advantages and the availability of methods to limit 
potential problems, strong data management policies and software-based 
privacy and redaction technologies are particularly attractive and robust 
methods of limiting the privacy problems of deploying police body worn 
cameras. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In light of the pressing need to heal the widening rift between the 
people and the police, body worn cameras have great potential to 
improve law enforcement accountability and provide accurate evidence 
of use of force and behavior, for both the police and the public. Despite 
costs and privacy concerns due to intrusive video and public records 
disclosure requirements, workable solutions exist for protecting privacy 
and making it possible to comply with disclosure laws, all while 
retaining the evidentiary and accountability benefits of body worn 
cameras. 
 These solutions, namely shortening data retention policies, 
tagging videos, and using redaction technology, all pose problems of 
their own, but do not undermine the principal justifications for investing 
resources into police body worn cameras in the first place, and may even 
yield increasing returns as the technology improves. Though efforts to 
reform police practices are frequently fraught with hidden dangers, 
unforeseen consequences, and emotionally charged accusations from all 
sides, police body worn cameras may serve as the means to cut through 
the fog and provide the police accountability so desperately needed to 
uphold equal justice under law. 
